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Abstract 
 
Since the 1980’s, many dictatorships around the world have been replaced by new 
democracies. These old dictatorships were notorious for their human rights abuses.1 
Many people were killed and tortured; and many others were disappeared.2 When the 
new governments came into power, they had to confront these injustices that were 
perpetrated under the predecessor regime. This was necessary to create a culture of 
human rights; promote a respect for the law and access to justice. Many confronted these 
injustices in different ways, some granted amnesty, some prosecuted and others instituted 
truth commissions3. This research paper focuses on truth commissions. The research 
focuses particularly on the study of the South African Truth Commission. The mandate of 
the South African Truth Commission is analysed; and the investigation into whether the 
commission served the purpose for which it had been established is discussed.4 
 
 
24 October 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See International Human Rights Clinic (2008: 122). 
2 See Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2010: 2.1.1). 
3 Freeman M (2006: 4). 
4 Gobodo-Madikizela P (2003: 51). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Definition of Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice is a range of judicial and non-judicial responses to systematic or 
widespread violations of human rights committed by former governments.5 It has 
established itself as the standard approach used for political transitions to democracy.6 It 
seeks recognition for victims; and for the promotion of possibilities for peace, justice, 
reconciliation and democracy.7 It is not a special form of justice but rather justice adapted 
to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuses. In 
some cases these transformations happen suddenly; in others, they take place over many 
decades.8 This type of response to human rights abuses emerged since the 1980’s.9  
 
1.2 Forms of Transitional Justice 
Various initiatives may be used during the transition process. These initiatives include 
criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programmes, gender justice, 
security reform, and memorialization efforts.10 These initiatives, however, do not form a 
numerus clausus.11 Transitional justice models also employ comparative learning 
techniques; model borrowing; and recruitment of practitioners or professionals from other 
conflict settings, as they then make use of their previous experiences.12   
The problems which stem from past human rights abuses are often too complex to be 
solved by any one of the above initiatives. Practice and experience have suggested that 
                                                 
5 International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009: 1); Humphrey M (2008: 3); Sooka Y (2009: 24). 
6 Humphrey M (2008: 3). 
7 International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009: 1); Humphrey M (2008: 3). 
8 International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009: 1). 
9 International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009: 1). 
10 Brahm E (2007: 62); International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009: 1). 
11 International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009: 1).  
12 Humphrey M (2008: 3). 
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transitional justice should include several measures which complement each other, as no 
single method is as effective on its own, as when combined with the others.13 
 
1.3 Research Question 
The focal point of this research paper is truth commissions. The topic of truth 
commissions is very extensive as there are various aspects which may be investigated. 
These include comparative studies of various truth commissions around the world; 
investigations into specific truth commissions; investigations into the difficulties which 
truth commissions undergo; or investigations of specific aspects of particular truth 
commissions.14 This research paper will deal with the general history of truth 
commissions around the world as an introduction. The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (hereafter TRC) will then be examined as the main focus of 
the research. The transition to democracy in South Africa will be discussed.15 The paper 
will then examine the main factors which led to the establishment of the TRC.16 The 
discussion will evaluate the mandate of the TRC17, the question of qualified amnesties 
granted, the scope of reparations and post-TRC developments with regard to 
prosecutions18. This research paper will be based on desktop research which will 
comprise the usage of primary and secondary sources.  
 
 
                                                 
13 International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009: 1); Humphrey M (2008: 3). 
14 Freeman M (2006: 11). 
15 Christie K (2000: 9 ff). 
16 Gobodo-Madikizela P (2003: 51). 
17 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
18 Fernandez L (2006: 65). 
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1.4 Truth Commissions  
 
1.4.1 Definition of a truth commission 
Truth commissions are generally temporary bodies officially sanctioned by the State and 
generally focus on the past. They investigate patterns of abuses over a period of time, and 
complement their work with the submission of a report.19  They are established in 
countries where there is an emergence from periods of political conflict or post-conflict 
transitions.20 Usually the situation is such that the prosecution of all those perpetrators of 
human rights violations would almost be impossible for various reasons, which may 
include the destruction of the judiciary. It would, therefore, almost be inevitable for the 
establishment of such a commission.21 
 
1.4.2 Ways of establishing a truth commission 
Truth commissions may be established in various ways. They may be established by 
international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGO’s), or by their national 
governments.22 
 
1.4.3 Aims of truth commissions 
Truth commissions are established for five basic aims. They are aimed at discovering, 
clarifying, and formally acknowledging past abuses; responding to specific needs of 
victims; contributing towards justice and accountability; outlining institutional 
                                                 
19 Hayner P (2002: 14). 
20 Avruch K and Vejarano B (2002: 52); Freeman M (2006: 4).  
21 Freeman M (2006: 3). 
22 Avruch K and Vejarano B (2002: 37). 
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responsibility and recommending reforms; and promoting reconciliation and reducing 
conflict over the past.23 
 
1.4.4 Mandate of truth commissions 
The mandates of truth commissions, generally, differ depending on the nature of the 
conflict which they are charged with investigating. It may be empowered to assign 
individual or group responsibility. Truth Commissions are also, as a rule, empowered to 
propose methods for the compensation of victims, and/or to recommend measures to 
bring about reconciliation.24 
 
1.4.5 Forms of truth commissions 
There are three types of truth commissions that have come into existence over the years: 
international, mixed and national truth commissions. International truth commissions 
comprise foreign nationals of the country in question; mixed truth commissions comprise 
both nationals and foreign nationals of the country in question; and national truth 
commissions comprise only the nationals of the country in question. The best known 
international truth commission was the Salvadoran truth commission. This commission 
comprised three foreign nationals who were designated by the United Nations Secretary 
General.25 The best known mixed truth commission was the Guatemalan truth 
commission. This commission comprised a German Law Professor (Professor 
Tomuschat) and two Guatemalan nationals.26 The South African Truth and 
                                                 
23 Hayner P (2002: 24). 
24 Buergenthal T (2006: 104 f). 
25 Buergenthal T (2006: 106); Hayner P (2006: 309). 
26 Buergenthal T (2006: 105). 
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Reconciliation Commission is the best known example of a national truth commission.27 
Other examples of national truth commissions are the Argentinean and Chilean truth 
commissions.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Boraine A (2009: 137); Buergenthal T (2006: 105); Hayner P (2006: 309). 
28 Hayner P (2006: 309). 
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Chapter 2: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
2.1 Why South Africa chose to establish a truth commission 
South Africa’s transition to democracy was quite a unique one, as it resulted from a 
political compromise between the outgoing (apartheid) government and the liberation 
movements.29 The outgoing government wanted to protect their members from civil and 
criminal prosecutions; and the liberation movements wanted to hold the previous 
government accountable for past human rights abuses.30 A blanket amnesty was 
considered at the negotiations. However, this was rejected by the representatives of the 
democratic movements. Full prosecutions of those who committed gross violations of 
human rights were also not an option that the apartheid government would accept. The 
negotiations concluded in a settlement (individual amnesty) which was put into to the 
Postamble of the Interim Constitution (hereafter IC).31 The IC did not, however, make 
mention of a truth commission. Recommendations for the establishment of a truth 
commission were later considered at two conferences held in 1994 by the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (hereafter IDASA) and Justice in Transition. These 
conferences made it possible for local stake holders in the transition process to meet 
people who had experienced and participated in similar transitions around the world.32   
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Campbell P (2000: 42); Colvin C (2008: 176); Van der Merwe H (1999: 159); Simpson G (1998: 
Introduction). 
30 Simpson G (1998: Introduction). 
31 Colvin C (2008: 179); Simpson G (1998: Introduction). 
32 Colvin C (2008: 179). 
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2.2 Previous truth-finding initiatives 
The establishment of the TRC was certainly not the first initiative of its kind in South 
Africa.33 There were previous attempts by both the National Party (hereafter NP) 
government and subsequently the African National Congress (hereafter ANC) to unravel 
the truth about the past.34 The (McNally Commission) was appointed in 1989 to examine 
claims regarding the alleged presence of a hit squad. While the commission found the 
allegations to be unfounded, later court cases showed that the allegations were largely 
true. A second commission, the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of 
Public Violence and Intimidation (Goldstone Commission), provided more substantiation 
of human rights abuses committed by the security forces. A subsequent commission 
(Steyn Commission) was established to follow-up on the findings of the Goldstone 
Commission, and to also examine the responsibility of high level military personnel. It 
produced a report to the State President which resulted in the forced resignation of 23 
high-ranking officers of the South African Defence Force (hereafter SADF). The content 
of the report was, however, was not made public at that time.35 A further two 
commissions were established by the ANC in 1992 and 1993. In 1992 the ANC initiated 
the Commission of Enquiry into the complaints by Former ANC Prisoners and Detainees 
(The Skweyiya Commission). 36 It was mandated to investigate human rights abuses 
which occurred in camps outside of South Africa. The commission, however, was 
accused of bias and lack of due process.37 In 1993 Nelson Mandela established a 
commission to re-look into the alleged abuses in the ANC detention camps. The 
                                                 
33 Christie K (2000: 33); Van Der Merwe H (1999: 163). 
34 Van Der Merwe H (1999:162). 
35 Van Der Merwe H (1999:163). 
36 Christie K (2000: 54 f); Hayner P (1994: 625 ff). 
37 Christie K (2000: 54 f). 
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commission was named as the ‘Commission of Enquiry into certain allegations of cruelty 
and human rights abuses against ANC prisoners and detainees by ANC members’ (The 
Motsuenyane Commission).38 It was run like a trial and the report was subsequently 
accepted by the African National Congress (hereafter ANC). The ANC, however, denied 
the reports findings that the ANC had a systemic policy in place. It consequently called 
for a truth commission to be set up to cover both sides of the abuses in South Africa since 
1948.39 
 
2.3 The creation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereafter TRC) was based on 
the final clause (Postamble) of the Interim Constitution of 1993.40 Its enabling Act was 
passed in Parliament as the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No 34 
of 1995 (hereafter TRC Act).41 It should be noted that until then, the TRC Act was the 
longest ever debated piece of legislation in the South African Parliament. It took about 
two years to be passed.42 The creation of the South African TRC was quite different to 
that of other countries. Chile’s truth commission was based on a presidential decree.43 El- 
Salvador’s truth commission was initiated through UN-brokered peace agreements. 
Guatemala’s truth commission, on the other hand, was based on peace agreements.44 The 
                                                 
38 Christie K (2000: 54 f); Hayner P (1994: 625 ff). 
39 Christie K (2000: 54 f); Hayner P (1994: 633); Fullard M and Rousseau N (2008: 217). 
40 The Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993. 
41 TRC (2010: Legal background to the TRC). 
42 Fullard M and Rousseau N (2008: 217). 
43 Presidential Decree No. 355. 
44 Hayner P (2006: 297 f). 
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South African experience was quite unique, as it was the outcome of hundreds of hours of 
hearing and considerable input from civil society.45 
The composition of the commission was determined by the President in consultation with 
his cabinet, which at that time included National Party ministers.46 The Act also required 
the Commissioners to be ‘fit and proper persons’ who were impartial and who did not 
have high political profiles.47 The nomination and selection process was highly 
transparent and open to public input.48  
The commissioners chosen came from different political, professional, and racial 
backgrounds.49 They were chosen by the president. There were 17 commissioners 
appointed, six of whom were legal practitioners.50 Three committees were created: the 
Human Rights Violations Committee (hereafter HRVC), the Amnesty Committee (AC), 
and the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee (hereafter RRC).51 Two additional 
structures (which assisted these committees) were the Investigation unit52, and various 
subcommittees.53  
The HRVC was responsible for investigating human rights abuses that took place 
between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994. 54 It was required to use the statements made to 
                                                 
45 Freeman M and Hayner P (2001: 140). 
46 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 7 (1); Van Der Merwe H (1999:180). 
47 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 7 (2) (b). 
48 Van Der Merwe H (1999:181). 
49 Van Der Merwe H (1999:181). 
50 Fullard M and Rousseau N (2008: 224). 
51 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (3); Van Der Merwe H (1999:186). 
52 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (3) (d). 
53 Van Der Merwe H (1999:186); Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (3) (d). 
54 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (3) (d); Freeman M and Hayner P (2001: 140); 
South African History Online (2010: Truth and Reconciliation Commission). 
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the TRC in order to find victims of gross human rights violations. It had to then refer 
these victims to the second committee (the RRC).55  
The RRC had to provide support for the victims in an effort to restore their dignity.56 It 
also had to design and put forward recommendations (based on the findings of the AC 
and HRVC) for a reparation programme.57 The programme had to promote rehabilitation 
and healing for the survivors, their families, and the community at large.58 The main goal 
was to develop effective ways of preventing such abuses from recurring in the future.59 
The RRC was, however, the least publicized of the three committees.60  
The AC processed and decided on individual applications for amnesty. 61 It had to do this 
by ensuring that the amnesty applications were carried out in accordance with the TRC 
Act.62  It should be noted that the entire amnesty committee consisted of judges and 
lawyers.63 The amnesty committee was empowered to grant amnesty (criminal and civil) 
to those who committed abuses during the apartheid era, as long as the crimes were 
politically motivated, proportionate, and there was full disclosure made by the persons 
seeking amnesty.64 Each amnesty application had to be given approval by President 
Mandela before it became final.65 7000 amnesty applications were made.66 
 
                                                 
55 Campbell P (2000: 48). 
56 Campbell P (2000: 48). 
57 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (3) (d); Freeman M and Hayner P (2001: 140); 
South African History Online (TRC); Leseka M (2000: Chapter 2). 
58 Campbell P (2000: 48). 
59 Campbell P (2000: 48). 
60 Leseka M (2000: Chapter 2). 
61Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (3) (d); Freeman M and Hayner P (2001: 140); 
South African History Online (2010: TRC). 
62 Campbell P (2000: 48). 
63 Fullard M and Rousseau N (2008: 224). 
64 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (3) (b) and s 18. 
65 Campbell P (2000: 48). 
66 Boraine A (2009: 137 ff); Freeman M and Hayner P (2001: 140). 
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It should be noted that the TRC was initially appointed by parliament to operate for a 
period of 18 months, with the possibility of extending its operation for another six 
months.67 However, the TRC came into existence on 16 December 1995 and continued 
operating until 30 October 1998. On this date, its interim final report (five volumes) was 
presented to the State President.68 The AC continued its operation until it had completed 
hearings on all the amnesty applications.69 The TRC thus operated much longer than was 
initially expected. The work of the AC was concluded on 31 May 2001.70 Its Report was 
released on 21 March 2003.71 
 
South Africa’s operational period was also quite long in comparison to other truth 
commissions (around the world) that were established during more or less the same time 
period. The Chilean truth commission completed its findings in over a year. The El 
Salvadoran truth commission completed its findings in under a year.72  
 
2.4 The mandate of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The South African TRC was mandated to promote national unity and reconciliation by 
establishing a complete picture of the gross human rights violations committed between 1 
March 1960 and 10 May 1994.73 The dates covered were just under 34 years. Chile had to 
investigate 17 years of human rights abuses. The El-Salvadoran truth commission had to 
                                                 
67 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 43 (1). 
68 See Fullard M and Rousseau N (2008: 216). 
69 Van Der Merwe H (1999:186), TRC Report, vol. 6, p. 1; South African History Online (2010: TRC). 
70 TRC Report, vol. 6, p. 1. 
71 Van Der Merwe H (1999:186), TRC Report, vol. 6, p. 1; South African History Online (2010: TRC). 
72 Hayner P (2006: 297 f). 
73Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 and 4 (f); Hayner P (2006: 298); Colvin C 
(2008: 181). 
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cover less than 12 years of violations. The Guatemalan Truth commission had to cover 
approximately 34 years of violations.74 
The South African TRC had to make use of the three committees to achieve its 
objectives. It had to compile a report providing a full account of its findings and give 
recommendations of measures which would prevent future violations of human rights.75  
It should be noted that the commissions’ detailed empowering Act gave it power to grant 
individualised amnesties, to search for evidence, to seize evidence, to subpoena witnesses 
and even to run a witness protection programme.76 The TRC had a staff of 300, who were 
housed in four offices throughout the country. It had an annual budget of approximately 
US$ 18 million per year, for two and a half years. It, therefore, represented a major 
departure in both scale and ambition from previous truth commissions around the world. 
The commission heard testimony from more than 21 000 victims and witnesses. It should 
be noted that approximately 2 000 of these witnesses and victims testified publicly.77 
The commission had hearings which focused on crimes against individuals. It further 
convened special sessions that were devoted to key institutions and their contributions to 
the apartheid structure.78 
 
2.5 Recommendations of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The TRC’s mandate required it to recommend reparation measures with regard to victims 
of human rights violations.79 It further required the TRC to recommend measures to 
                                                 
74 Hayner P (2006: 297 f). 
75 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3; Colvin (2008: 181). 
76 Freeman M and Hayner P (2001: 140). 
77 Boraine A (2009: 137 f); Freeman M and Hayner P (2001: 140). 
78 Boraine A (2009: 137 f). 
79 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (1) (c). 
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prevent the future violations of human rights.80 Both these tasks were undertaken by the 
Reparation and Rehabilitation Commission. These recommendations will be discussed 
under the chapter on Reparations. 
 
2.6 Positive Remarks of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The most remarkable aspect of South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy 
was that it happened through dialogue and eventual negotiated settlement.81 This is quite 
different to post-war Germany, which was as a result of a war. South Africa’s transition, 
however, was similar to that of Chile, as both South Africa and Chile’s transformations 
were negotiated. Germany decided to prosecute, and was later accused of applying 
victor’s justice. Chile, on the other hand, established a truth commission, but could not 
prosecute those who committed gross human rights violations, as much of the power was 
still with the previous government. Germany is thus an example of victors’ justice and 
Chile, on the other hand, is an example of where de facto blanket amnesty was applied. 
South Africa, however, through the negotiated settlement, managed to avoid blanket 
amnesty, by allowing it only where the person applying for amnesty made full disclosure 
of the crime in question; and that the act was politically motivated.82 This amnesty for 
truth requirement was the first of its kind. 83  
 
 
 
                                                 
80 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (1) (d). 
81 Bell P (2000: Background). 
82 Simpson G (1998: Introduction); Athiemoolam L (2003: 3 f). 
83 Simpson G (1998: Introduction). 
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Chapter 3: Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations 
This chapter attempts to investigate the process followed by the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (hereafter TRC) in giving effect to its mandate. This chapter, 
more specifically, investigates whether or not the TRC had served the purpose for which 
it was established with regard to the promotion of national unity and reconciliation. 
Firstly, the aspect of ‘truth’ in the context of promoting national unity and reconciliation 
will be investigated. Secondly, the aspect of ‘reconciliation’ with regard to promoting 
national unity and reconciliation will be looked at. The third topic of discussion will be 
the issue of reparations granted by the government.    
 
Chapter 3.1: Truth Findings 
South Africa’s TRC was charged by Parliament to establish a complete picture of the 
causes, nature, and extent of gross violations of human rights. The picture should have 
included the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of the violations.84 It should 
be noted that there were no submissions for the TRC to cover more violations.85  
Truth findings were the major role of the Human Rights Violations Committee (hereafter 
HRVC) as it had the power of investigation granted to it by the commission.86 The truth 
required by the TRC Act is known as macro-historical truth, as it provides a framework 
for understanding the structural causes of violence, and leads to the identification of the 
causes and authors of the abuses.87 Macro-historical truth findings include identifying: 
those who were responsible for patterns of human rights violations; when and why 
                                                 
84 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (1) (a); Freeman M and Hayner P (2001: 140). 
85 Fullard M and Rousseau N (2008: 218). 
86 Omar D (2010: Explanation of the TRC). 
87 Chapman A and Ball P (2008: 143 f); Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (1) (a). 
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decisions were taken to abuse communities and groups; how these abuses were enacted; 
and what kinds of structural factors enabled these human rights violations to occur.88 
Macro-historical truth findings are especially relevant in societies where pervasive human 
rights violations took place.  Examples of such countries are Uganda, Chile, El Salvador 
and South Africa.89  In such a context, the person who pulled the trigger would not 
usually be the same person who created the political conditions that resulted in the crime 
being committed.90 Specific violations are usually the outcome of orders taken at higher 
levels of the hierarchy, and in order to determine ultimate responsibility, it is paramount 
to identify the intellectual authors of the crimes in question.91  
 
Macro-historical truth findings (in the absence of direct confession from the perpetrators) 
would require tens of thousands of cases to be analyzed. This could be done by utilising 
social-science methodologies that would display a pattern, and thereby uncover a policy 
abuse. These types of determinations require extensive research, advanced methods of 
data collection and processing, and complex information management systems which 
would lead to the analysis and the interpretation of the findings.92  
 
South Africa is not the first country to charge its commission with macro-historical truth 
findings. In Guatemala, the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission made use of 
such an initiative and reported that 200, 000 people were killed; 83 percent of whom were 
                                                 
88 Chapman A and Ball P (2008: 145). 
89 Hayner P (2006: 300 ff). 
90 Chapman A and Ball P (2008: 145). 
91 Chapman A and Ball P (2008: 145 f); Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (1) (a). 
92 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 146). 
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Mayan.93 This led them to the conclusion that State had engaged in genocide against the 
Mayan community.94 El-Salvador, Peru and several other truth commissions have also 
made use of such methods to make important macro-historical truth findings.95    
 
In order to evaluate whether the TRC fulfilled its mandate regarding the establishment of 
macro-historical truth, the following issues will be looked at: 
(a) How did the TRC define truth? 
(b) How did the TRC interpret its mandate? 
(c) Which sources did the TRC use to establish the truth? 
(d) What were TRC’s macro-historical contributions? 
(e) What did the TRC fail to do? 
 
3.1.1 How did the TRC define truth?  
The TRC distinguished between four notions of truth: factual truth; personal truth; social 
truth; and restorative truth.96 According to the TRC, factual truth is impartial evidence.97 
It is the legal notion of bringing to light factual corroborated evidence.98  
Personal truth evokes the cathartic benefits of storytelling which could contribute towards 
psychological healing after trauma.99 This is a form of restorative justice.100 This process 
                                                 
93 Hayner P (2001: 48); See Freeman M and Hayner P (2001: 141 ff). 
94 Chapman A and Ball P (2008: 145). 
95 Chapman A and Ball P (2008: 145 f); Hayner P (2001: 48). 
96 TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 113; Avruch K and Vejarano B (2002: 39). 
97 Chapman A and Ball P (2008: 146). 
98 TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 111. 
99 Chapman A and Ball P (2008: 146). 
100 TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 9. 
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involves restoring the dignity of victims. This is done through the official 
acknowledgment of the victim’s version of what happened.101   
Social truth refers to the process and dialogue that surrounded the work of the TRC.102 
This was achieved by the public hearings and the media.103  
Finally, restorative truth is the kind of truth that places facts and their meaning within the 
context of human relationships.104 Acknowledgement is an example in this regard as it 
affirms that the persons pain is real and worthy of attention.105 
It should be noted that of the four notions of truth used by the TRC, only factual truth 
contributes towards macro-historical truth findings as was required by the TRC. 
 
3.1.2 The TRC’s approach to human rights violations  
It should be noted that the TRC’s mandate was limited to investigating only physical 
gross human rights abuses.106 Forced removals and the displacement of millions of 
people based on race did not form part of its mandate. Everyday policies and practices of 
apartheid that did not result in killings, abduction, torture, or severe ill-treatment did also 
not form part of its mandate.107 This led to major criticism of the TRC and its process.108 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101 Brahm E (2004: Strengths and Weakness of Truth Commissions). 
102 Chapman A and Ball P (2008: 146). 
103 TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 117. 
104 Chapman A and Ball P (2008: 146); TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 117; Avruch K and Vejarano B (2002: 39). 
105 TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 117. 
106 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 147); Fullard M Rousseau N (2008: 225). 
107 Hayner (2006: 302); See Fullard M Rousseau N (2008: 225); See also Campbell P (2000: 51). 
108 Fullard M Rousseau N (2008: 225). 
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3.1.3 Which sources did the TRC use to establish the truth? 
It should be noted that the majority of the official State records were destroyed by the 
security forces prior to the TRC’s coming into existence.109 As a consequence, the TRC 
mainly had three primary data sources which it could use for macro-historical analysis. 
These sources were the victims’ statements, the human rights violations’ hearings, and 
the amnesty process.110 
 
The Human Rights Violations Committee (hereafter HRVC) had interviews with the 
survivors, witnesses, and surviving relatives of victims from the apartheid regime. These 
interviews were guided by a protocol designed to elicit empirical and narrative truth.111 
The original version of the protocol provided for open ended questions. However, the 
protocol was later amended to provide only for closed-ended questions, which led to the 
process being frequently described as a dog licence application. A limited space for a 
narrative was eventually re-incorporated into the protocol.112  
 
The HRVC held five types of public hearings113 which included: human rights violations 
hearings; event hearings; theme hearings that focused on groups or types of victims; 
hearings that dealt with the role of political parties; and institutional hearings dealing 
with the role of organizations.114  It invested most of its staff-time in the human rights 
violations hearings.115 This provided an opportunity for the victims to testify. The 
                                                 
109 TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 201; See Brahm E (2004: The operation of truth commissions). 
110 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 150). 
111 See Brounéus  K (2007: 4). 
112 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 151). 
113 See Brahm E (2004: The operation of truth commissions). 
114 TRC Report, vol. 6, p. 570; See Brahm E (2004: The operation of truth commissions). 
115 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 153). 
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location and dates of these hearings can be found in the TRC’s report.116 During these 
hearings, deponents were given about 30 minutes to convey their narratives. The 
commissioners did not play an important role during this process, as they merely 
commented on the narratives, and rarely followed up questions to clarify the information 
conveyed by the deponents. The HRVC, therefore, treated these hearings more as a forum 
to affirm the participants and to undertake broad public education about the general 
nature of the abuses and sufferings under apartheid, than as a means to elicit good quality 
information for truth recovery purposes. The hearings were, therefore, primarily used as a 
source of anecdotal data for the themes in the report.117 The HRVC selected witnesses to 
participate in the hearings using a variety of criteria. It required that the hearing should 
reflect accounts from all sides of the political conflict; that the entire thirty-four year 
mandate period should be covered; that those who testify should be diverse and include 
men, women and the experiences of youth; and that there should be an attempt to at least 
provide an overall picture of the experiences of the region.118 These criteria resulted in a 
situation where White statement-givers were four times more likely to be selected for the 
hearings than African statement-givers.119 The people who testified in the hearings were, 
therefore, not representative of the population that gave statements. 
 
It should be noted that one of the requirements for obtaining amnesty was that the 
applicant should have made full disclosure of the act, omission or offence.120 The 
Amnesty Committee took a legalistic view of this requirement as it only admitted 
                                                 
116 TRC Report, vol. 4, p. 24 f. 
117 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 153 f). 
118 TRC Report, vol. 5, p. 5 f. 
119 TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 168; Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 154). 
120 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 20 (1) (c). 
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information pertaining to the events for which the applicants requested amnesty. It did 
not even attempt to collect a career history from individual applicants, which would have 
enabled them to place the abuses in the context of the collective violations of specific 
units.121 
 
3.1.4 What were the TRC’s macro historical contributions? 
The TRC has (to a limited extent), contributed towards macro-historical findings. It 
established that there were patterns of human rights abuses that occurred during the 
apartheid era; that the State security forces were involved in these violations; and it 
established findings of accountability.122  
 
3.1.5 Patterns of Human Rights abuses 
The HRVC collected a total of 21 519 victim statements during its two-year operational 
period. At least one gross human rights violation was contained in over 15 000 of the 
statements. Over 30 384 violations were contained in the 21 519 statements that were 
taken. The HRVC thus made over 15 000 findings during this period.123  
 
3.1.6 Involvement of the State Security Council (hereinafter SSC) in the Violations 
The TRC made good progress in establishing the involvement of the SSC with regard to 
human rights violations. One of the main contributions made by the amnesty process was 
that it challenged the argument presented by the political leadership of the former 
apartheid government (specifically F.W. de Klerk) that the violations were conducted by 
                                                 
121 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 156). 
122 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 159 f). 
123 TRC Report, vol. 6, p.570; See van Der Merwe H (1999: 190). 
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a handful of bad apples in renegade units. The hearings also offered insights into the 
manner in which the security police waged war against the ANC; particularly its efforts 
to eliminate operatives and suspects in the ANC’s military wing.124 
 
3.1.7 The TRC’s Findings on Accountability 
The TRC made findings that both State and non-State parties were responsible for gross 
human rights abuses. The TRC’s evidence indicates that the State was responsible for the 
greatest number of gross violations of human rights that were committed during the 
thirty- four year mandate period.125  
Certain members of the SSC were liable under the TRC Act. These include the State 
President, the minister of defence, minister of law and order and the heads of the security 
forces. Their liability was based on the notion that they foresaw that their usage of the 
words such as take out, wipe out, eradicate and eliminate would result in the killings of 
political opponents. They were, therefore, responsible for planning gross human rights 
violations. Even though some of the members of the SSC did not foresee that the usage of 
the words would result in killings; they were still morally and politically responsible for 
the killings. This was due to their failure to exercise proper care in their usage of words; 
their failure to investigate killings that had occurred; and their failure to heed complaints 
about the abuses that had taken place. Their usage of militant rhetoric created a climate 
where human rights violations were possible. They were, therefore, guilty of official 
tolerance of violations, and are thus accountable for such violations.126 
                                                 
124 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 159). 
125 TRC Report, vol. 5, p. 213; See Humphrey M (2008: 4). 
126 TRC Report, vol. 5, p. 218; See Cilliers A (2000: Truth and Reconciliation Commission). 
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The report also provides that various political parties were accountable for gross human 
rights abuses. The TRC concluded that the Inkatha Freedom Party (hereafter IFP) was the 
primary political party responsible for gross human rights violations.127  
 
3.1.8 What did the TRC fail to do regarding its mandate to establish the truth? 
The TRC’s enabling Act provided that it should establish a complete picture of the 
causes, nature and extent of the human rights violations; which should include the 
antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of these violations; and the perspectives 
of the victims and the motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the 
commission of the violations.128 The TRC failed in many ways with regard to its mandate 
in establishing truth. It failed to explain apartheid as an organisational phenomenon; it 
failed to understand apartheid as a system; it failed to deal with racism adequately; it 
failed to identify the intellectual authors of apartheid crimes; and it failed to highlight 
ethnic violence and the role of a third force.129 
 
3.1.8.1 Failures of the TRC with regard to truth finding 
The TRC focused its attention on actual cases and acts; but not on the antecedents, 
causes, organisations, ideologies, and perspectives that gave rise to the acts.130 It looked 
at individual cases, but did not look at the broader picture, as was required by the TRC 
Act. It did also not investigate the causes of the violence. There was no assessment made 
on how particular units came to be as violent as they did; how these units evolved over 
                                                 
127 TRC Report, vol. 5, p. 213 and 233; See Rauch J (2004: The Race and Citizenship in Transition Series). 
128 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (1). 
129 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 161 ff). 
130 See Simpson G (1998: Listening to the voices of victims). 
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time; or how racist beliefs were indoctrinated among new recruits.131 The TRC had power 
to investigate all of these avenues and to collect all of this data; however, it decided not to 
do so.132 
 
The TRC appeared to assume that the purpose of these hearings was to document the 
nature of the human rights abuses that took place within particular institutions and 
sectors. It did not, however, examine why they occurred or the overall role that these 
institutions played within the apartheid system.133 The commission endorsed the position 
in international law that provides that apartheid is a form of systematic racial 
discrimination and separation, and that it constitutes a crime against humanity.134 
However, the matter of racial discrimination was not discussed any further in its report.135 
The TRC Report provides that when searching for justice and accountability with regard 
to past crimes, it is important to go beyond those who commit the crimes, and to identify 
those who were complicit in the violations, as they planned and conceptualised them.136 
However, the TRC did very little in this regard.137 The TRC was unable to establish the 
extent of covert networks; and how they evolved and mutated during the conflict period. 
It is, therefore, not clear whether the senior security force personnel involved represented 
their own, state or right-wing agendas. It should be noted, however, that that the TRC at 
                                                 
131 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 162); See Fullard M and Rousseau N (2008: 216). 
132 Brahm E (2004: The operation of truth commissions). 
133 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 164). 
134 TRC Report, vol. 5, p. 222. 
135 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 164 ff). 
136 TRC Report, vol. 6, p. 633. 
137 Chapman A and Ball R (2008: 166 ff). 
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least acknowledged the probability of the existence of several agendas, at different levels 
within political and security force hierarchies.138 
 
The TRC investigated the role of a third force involved in the violence.139 Its report 
provides that allegations of third force activity reached a crescendo in the wake of the 
Boipatong massacre in June 1992. The TRC did not, however, undertake detailed 
investigations into all allegations of security force complicity, as it relied on a number of 
reports submitted to it by monitoring groups who went into Boipatong after the massacre. 
It thus based its report only on the testimony received.140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 TRC Report, vol. 6, p. 588; Brahm E (2004: The operation of truth commissions). 
139 Van Der Merwe H (1999: 208). 
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Chapter 3.2: Reconciliation 
The TRC was established by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 
(hereafter TRC Act)141 which grew out of the Interim Constitution (hereafter IC).142 The 
IC did refer to reconciliation, but did not, however, explain what should be achieved 
through reconciliation. The provisions found in the IC epitomized the promulgation of a 
model for achieving reconciliation, but did not define the core-concept.143  
 
The TRC Act required the TRC to promote national unity and reconciliation.144 It should 
be noted that the South African TRC was initially mooted only as a truth commission. 
However, the notion of national unity and reconciliation was only later added. This was 
largely done to address the perception of the non-liberation movements that a witch-hunt 
would follow.145  The TRC Act did not define what reconciliation meant. It did not 
specify which activities would contribute towards the process of reconciliation. It did not 
identify the parties that were to be reconciled. It did not establish a committee or unit for 
the purpose of reconciliation; or offer guideposts or indicators to evaluate the 
contribution of the TRC to reconciliation.146  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
141 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
142 The Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993.  
143 Borer T (2004: 28). 
144 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (1); Simpson G (1998: Introduction). 
145 Fullard M and Rousseau N (2008: 217). 
146 Chapman A (2009: 46); See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3. 
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3.2.1 How did the TRC interpret its mandate? Did it promote reconciliation? 
The following questions will be examined in this regard: 
a) How did the TRC interpret its mandate, and who should be reconciled? 
b) How did individual commissioners of the TRC interpret ‘reconciliation’ during the 
Public Hearings?147 
c) What effect did the amnesty proceedings have on reconciliation? 
 
3.2.2  How did the TRC interpret its mandate? Who should be reconciled? 
Reconciliation was not clearly defined in the TRC’s mandate. It was therefore, left to its 
own devices to wrestle with both the definition of the term and how to structure its work 
to best facilitate it.148 The TRC acknowledged in its report that the interpretation of 
reconciliation was highly contested.149  
 
The TRC referred (during its work) to reconciliation as both a process and a goal.150 It 
further referred to four levels of reconciliation, namely: coming to terms with the painful 
truth; reconciliation between victims and perpetrators; reconciliation at a community 
level; and promoting national unity and reconciliation.151 The first level of reconciliation 
concerned closure for both the victim and the perpetrator. The second level concerned 
forgiveness152 and healing between the victim and perpetrator. The third level of 
reconciliation concerned community reconciliation.153 Finally, the fourth level of 
                                                 
147 Chapman A (2008: 47). 
148 Borer T (2004: 28). 
149 TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 106. 
150 See Brahm E (2004: Strengths and weaknesses of truth commissions). 
151 TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 106 ff. 
152 See Simpson G (1998: Listening to the voices of victims); See also McGregor L (2001:37). 
153 See van der Merwe H (199: 371). 
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reconciliation concerned reconciliation between those who benefited from the past and 
those who continue to be disadvantaged154 by past discrimination.155  
The TRC’s recommended that multi-layered healing of human relationships was required 
in post-apartheid South Africa. These include the relationship of individuals with 
themselves; the relationship between victims; the relationship between survivors and 
perpetrators; the relationship within families, the relationship between neighbours, 
communities and within communities; the relationship within different institutions; the 
relationships between different generations; the relationships between racial and ethnic 
groups; the relationship between workers and management and; above all, the 
relationship between the beneficiaries of apartheid and those who have been 
disadvantaged by it.156  
 
3.2.3 How did individual commissioners of the TRC understand reconciliation 
during the Public Hearings? 
The TRC acknowledged that it had a particular difficulty of understanding the meaning 
of unity and reconciliation at a national level. The views of members of the TRC ranged 
from the politico-judicial approaches to explicitly religious approaches to reconciliation. 
These approaches are fairly different. It should be noted that there was no attempt made 
by the TRC to integrate or harmonise the different conceptions of reconciliation.157 Some 
of the commissioners spoke of reconciliation, but were unclear when assigning 
                                                 
154 Athiemoolam L (2003: 4 ff). 
155 TRC Report, vol. 1, p. 108. 
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responsibility. 158 Others focused on individual reconciliation; and, yet, others focused on 
national unity and reconciliation.159  
 
3.2.4 What effect did the amnesty proceedings have on reconciliation? 
The TRC was mandated to promote national unity and reconciliation.160 One of the ways 
in which the TRC had to do this was by facilitating the granting of amnesty.161 This was 
done by the Amnesty Committee (AC). One of the striking features of the AC was that it 
had powers of implementation.162 Three requirements were needed for a successful 
amnesty application: the application should have complied with the requirements of the 
Act; it should have been in relation to an act associated with a political objective; and the 
applicant should have made full disclosure of all the relevant facts associated with the act 
in question.163 Once these requirements were met, the AC could grant amnesty to that 
person in relation to the act, omission or offence for which amnesty was applied for.164 
Martin Coetzee165 says that the AC was the subject of intensive scrutiny and criticism 
from the very start. Even though the Amnesty Committee was a creature of statute and 
the result of a negotiated settlement, its task was seen to stand in contradiction to work of 
the other TRC committees.166 The Human Rights Violations Committee (hereafter 
HRVC) devoted much of its time and energy to the acknowledgment of the painful 
                                                 
158 See Chapman A (2008: 48). 
159 Chapman A (2008: 47). 
160 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (1). 
161 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (1) (b); See Simpson G (1998: Introduction). 
162 See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, chapter 4. 
163 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 20 (1). 
164 See International Human Rights Clinic (2008: 52). 
165 Martin Coetzee was the Executive Secretary of the Amnesty Committee.  
166 Coetzee M (2003: 181). 
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experiences of victims of gross violations of human rights. However, the AC freed many 
of these perpetrators.167  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
167 Coetzee M (2003: 181); Promotion of  National Unity and Reconciliation Act, chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3.3: The South African TRC and Reparations 
Since the 1980’s, reparations have become a key element of democratic transitions. Many 
countries around the world have, to date, implemented reparation programmes through 
truth commissions. There is also an international obligation upon States to provide 
effective remedies for violations of fundamental human rights. These instruments include 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights168 and many other international legal 
conventions, covenants, declarations, and regional instruments.169 
 
Reparations are one of the main means by which truth commissions seek to achieve 
national and individual reconciliation.170 In South Africa, however, the issue of 
reparations was initially legislated in the Interim Constitution171 which provided that the 
violent effects of apartheid should be addressed on the basis of understanding, reparations 
and ubuntu.172 When the Final Constitution173 was enacted on December 10 1996, there 
was no direct mention made of reparations. However, schedule 6 of the Final 
Constitution provides that the provisions relating to amnesty contained in the Interim 
Constitution are deemed to be part of the Final Constitution for purposes of the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (hereafter TRC Act). The TRC Act 
thus provided for the establishment of a Reparations and Rehabilitations Committee 
(hereafter RRC) which was tasked with dealing with matters regarding reparations.174 
 
                                                 
168 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217. 
169 Colvin C (2008: 178). 
170 Hamber B and Wilson R (2002: The meaning of reparations and acknowledgement). 
171 Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993. 
172 Colvin C (2008: 178 f); Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993, Postamble. 
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3.3.1 The Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) 
The RRC consisted of a chairperson, a vice chairperson and five other members. The 
TRC Act required its members to be suitably qualified, South African citizens, and 
broadly representative of the South African community.175 The nationality requirement 
was akin to that of Argentina, as it too opted to constitute its members of its nationals.176  
 
The RRC was mandated to design and put forward recommendations (based on the 
findings of the AC and HRVC) for a reparation policy.177 It had to make 
recommendations to the President for both an urgent interim reparations policy (hereafter 
UIRP) and final reparations policy (hereafter FRP).178  
 
The UIRP recommendations had to be made during the life of the TRC and the FRP 
recommendations had to be included in its final report. It could also make 
recommendations with regard to the creation of institutions that are conducive to a stable 
and fair society. Furthermore, it could recommend institutional, administrative, and 
legislative measures which would prevent human rights abuses.179 The recommendations 
had to be handed over to the President. The President had to then consider the 
recommendations; and make his own recommendations to parliament. The joint houses of 
parliament had to then consider the Presidential recommendations and formulate its own 
recommendations. The recommendations (of the joint houses of parliament) had to then 
                                                 
175 See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 24 (3). 
176 Hayner P (2006: 308). 
177 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 3 (3) (d); Freeman M and Hayner P (2001: 140); 
South African History Online (2010: TRC); Leseka M (2000: Chapter 2). 
178 Leseka M (2000: Chapter 2); See Campbell P (2000: 48). 
179 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 4 (h); Colvin C (2008: 182). 
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be debated in parliament and approved in the form of a Parliamentary Resolution. The 
President had to then enact the resolution. The recommendations would then be the basis 
upon which reparations were granted.180 
 
3.3.2 The President’s Fund181 
 Section 42 of the TRC Act provided for the creation of a fund182 (President’s Fund) that 
would hold, and later disburse, any funds that have been made available to victims as 
reparations. This fund had to be administered by officers in the public service (who were 
designated by the Minister of Justice). The fund had to contain all the monies 
appropriated to it by Parliament; donated to it by non-governmental sources; and that 
accrued to it from investments. Money which was not required for immediate use may 
have been invested.183   
  
3.3.3 Urgent Interim Reparation Policy 
In 1996 (after the AZAPO184 case) the RRC got down to its work. Its two principle 
mandates were to make determinations on applications for reparations, and formulate 
recommendations for urgent interim reparations (hereafter UIR) and final reparations 
(hereafter FR). It, however, took on a further responsibility of implementing the UIR 
program. The latter responsibility was not provided for in the TRC Act.185 
 
                                                 
180 Colvin C (2008: 183); See Leseka M (2000: Chapter 2). 
181 See Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (2003: 9 f). 
182 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 42. 
183 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, s 42; Colvin C (2008: 182); See Khulumani 
Support Group (2007: Charter for Redress). 
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185 Colvin C (2008: 187). 
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The first task undertaken by the RRC was to complete its recommendations for the UIR. 
However, it was only empowered to recommend policy to the government. The RRC 
considered: terminally ill victims; victims who had no fixed homes or shelter; victims 
who were orphaned as a result of the violation; victims whose physical impairments 
markedly affect their social functioning; and victims requiring special education of 
mental or physical disability; as especially urgent applicants.186 
The UIR payments were calculated based on the need and number of dependants the 
victim supported. Applicants with no dependants were eligible for a payment up to R2, 
000. If the applicant had one dependant, he/she would be eligible for a payment up to R2, 
900. If the applicant had two dependants, he/she would be eligible for a payment up to 
R3, 750.  If the applicant had three dependants, he/she would be eligible for a payment up 
to R4, 530.  If the applicant had four dependants, he/she would be eligible for a payment 
up to R5, 205. If the applicant had five or more dependants, he/she would be eligible for a 
payment up to R5, 705.187 
 
These recommendations were handed over to the President in September 1996.188 The 
Regulations, however, were only promulgated in April 1998. The first payments were 
made in July 1998189, as the TRC was ending its work.190 The work of the RRC (with 
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regard to the UIR) was completed in 2001. R44, 000, 000 was paid out to 14 000 victims 
in the form of cash payments which ranged between R 2, 000 to R 5, 600.191 
 
It should be noted that most of the victims who received the UIR payments were pleased 
with the payments. However, they all agreed that the amounts that they received made 
little material difference in their lives. The victims’ understanding of what the purpose of 
the reparations was differed significantly. Some held the view that it was symbolic 
gestures of acknowledgment. Others saw the payments as inadequate, and consequently 
fell even more alienated from the TRC’s mission of forgiveness and reconciliation.192 
None of them, however, saw it as blood money used to buy their silence in the face of 
amnesties that dishonoured the dead. The latter issue was quite problematic with other 
reparations programmes.193  
Those who were denied the payment became jealous and mad. Those who received 
payment reported an increase in family and community conflicts. It should be noted that 
the money received by the victims was used for essentials, tombstones, and or memorial 
celebrations for those who had died in the struggle.194 
 
3.3.4 Final Reparation Policy 
The RRC was also tasked with drafting the final reparations policy (hereafter FRP) which 
would be handed over to the President. The RRC had difficulty in understanding what 
was meant by reparations by only looking at the TRC Act. It, therefore, turned to 
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international literature on reparations and to the South African community in order to 
derive a working definition.195 The RRC consequently derived its working definition of 
reparations from common international definitions of reparations. The definition was 
based on redress, restitution, rehabilitation, restoration of dignity, and re-assurance of 
non-recurrence.196 It also held a series of public hearings to open up the debate with 
regard to the final reparations policy. It subsequently held a national consultative process 
with individual victims, victim advocacy groups, churches, NGO’s, civil society and 
human rights organisations. It did this in order to refine and develop a policy around final 
reparations.197 
When the victims were asked (in private) as to what their primary needs were, the 
majority of them saw money or compensation as their primary priority and need. The 
secondary need was for investigations into the violations they have suffered.198 
The most enduring issue in the reparations debate was symbolic versus financial 
reparations.199 Most victims asked for money, and most non-victims were reluctant to 
equate reparations with cash. The RRC was initially reluctant to recommend any form of 
financial reparations as it held that there was a greater need for symbolic and collective 
reparation. However, it later integrated financial reparations as a central part of its policy 
recommendations.200 
There was also much public debate as to whether the reparations should be in straight 
monetary payments, or whether service packages would be more appropriate.  
                                                 
195 See Naidu E (2004: Methodology). 
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Other debates surrounded the issue of sustainability. Khumbula201, a victim support 
group, argued that reparations should be accompanied by financial planning and legal 
protection, in order to protect victims from those who might attempt to defraud the 
victims. The Cape Town NGO’s had a different view. It saw this as irrelevant 
patronising. It held the view that the reparations were symbolic in nature, and not meant 
to be a victim’s means of support. The RRC ultimately decided to recommend financial 
payments called individual reparation grants. With regard to the formula for calculating 
the value of the grants, the RRC recommended that no distinction should be made based 
on the severity of violation inflicted upon the victim, and the victim’s present financial 
status.202  
In October 1998, the TRC handed over its interim203 final report to the President.204 The 
RRC’s recommendations appear in Volume 5, Chapter 5 of the report. The 
recommendations were summarised in the final two volumes of the final report which 
were released in March 2003.205 
The policy provided for two reasons why reparations were needed. It provided that there 
could be no healing without adequate reparation and rehabilitation measures. The second 
reason provided by the policy was that reparations were necessary to counterbalance 
amnesty.206 It further emphasised South Africa’s international obligation to provide 
victims of human rights abuses with fair and adequate compensation.207 The report 
                                                 
201 Khumbula was launched in 1998 as a non-governmental organisation that aimed to address the 
conditions of ex–combatants after the liberation struggle. See Naidu E (2004: Finding a Place in History). 
202 Colvin C (2008: 192); See Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (2003: 8 f). 
203 The report was an interim report as the work of the amnesty committee was still continuing. The final 
two volumes of the TRC final Report was released in March 2003. 
204 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (2003: 9). 
205 Colvin C (2008: 193). 
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provides that the compensation should be substantial. It further provides that reparations 
are a moral requirement of the transition out of apartheid, and it links reparations to the 
moral integrity of the TRC process. It recommended that the implementation of 
reparations should be development centred, simple and effective, culturally appropriate, 
and community based. It should promote healing and reconciliation.208   
 
3.3.5 Principles that guided the development of the RRC’s reparations and 
rehabilitation policy 
It should be noted that there were five principles that guided the development of the 
RRC’s reparations and rehabilitation policy. These principles include: urgent interim 
reparations, individual reparations grants, symbolic reparations, community 
rehabilitation, and institutional reform.209 The position with regard to urgent reparation 
grants has already been discussed under 3.3.3. The TRC also recommended that the 
different forms of reparations should complement each other.210 
Individual reparations grants were recommended in the TRC’s final report. It was based 
on the median annual household income in 1997 for a family of five in South Africa.211 It 
comprised three components which included: the acknowledgment of suffering (50%); 
access to services (25%); and daily living costs (25%).212  
                                                 
208 TRC Report, vol. 5, p. 172 ff. 
209 Naidu E (2004: Background); TRC, vol. 5, p. 184 ff. 
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Symbolic reparations were designed to facilitate the restoration of dignity of the victims. 
The reparations included individual interventions, community interventions and national 
interventions.213  
Community rehabilitation focused on special types of reparations for communities. The 
RRC recommended that the measures should be integrated in the broader attempt to 
transform services in South Africa.214  
The RRC was also mandated to make recommendations that would help prevent the 
recurrence of human rights violations. In this regard, the RRC recommended that the 
measures and programmes outlined in the chapter on recommendations215 should become 
part of the operational plans and ethos of a wide range of sectors in society (i.e. 
institutional reform).216  
 
3.3.6 Implementation Process 
It should be noted that the RRC’s recommendations also included plans for the 
implementation process. It suggested that a structure should be developed in the office of 
the President. It should have a secretariat and a fixed life-span. Its function was to 
oversee the implementation of the reparation and rehabilitation policy proposals and 
recommendations.217   
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217 TRC Report, vol.5, p. 312; See Naidu E (2004: Background). 
 
 
 
 
 39
The recommendations made by the RRC did not give much guidance with regard to the 
RRC’s understanding of the potential economic burdens of its recommendations. Its 
recommendations generally comprised simple lists of possible reparative measures.218 
 
The government allocated R30, 000 to each victim as a one-time payment. At R30, 000 a 
victim, the total expenditure with regard to victims amounted to approximately R660, 
000, 000.219  The RRC’s recommendations also included several schemes for financing 
the reparations. These included: wealth tax (which has been ruled out by government)220; 
once-off levies; retrospective surcharges; one off donations; surcharge on golden 
handshakes.221 These ideas were also offered as part of broader macro-economic policies 
that would support reconstruction and development. It should be noted that the victims 
acted quite negatively to the R30, 000 individual grants. Many victim organisations 
insisted that a once-off payment of a token amount was not acceptable.222 
 
3.3.7 Interaction between government and victims 
It should also be noted that no meaningful conversation has taken place between the 
government and representatives of victims or civil society. The then Minister of Justice, 
Maduna, said that the government was under no obligation to consult with victims during 
any point of the process. Since dialogue seemed unlikely to produce the desired results, 
the victims decided to turn to legal activism in their case against the government. 
                                                 
218 Colvin C (2008: 193 ff); See Leseka M (2000: Conclusion). 
219 Colvin C (2008: 197 f). 
220 See Valji N (2003: Apology without reparation). 
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However, they lacked the legal knowledge with regard to which options were available. 
They also lacked resources to pursue these options. However, with the aid of legal aid 
organisations, there were some legal initiatives that took place in this regard. An example 
of such an initiative would be where the Khulumani (victim support group) filed a suite 
under the terms of the Access to Information Act in order to access the governments draft 
policy on reparations.223  
The reason given by government (after the handing over of the interim final report, and 
before the handing over of the final two volumes of the final report) for the delay in 
taking the reparations process further, is that the TRC’s AC has not finished its work. The 
Department of Justice and Presidency argued that the TRC was not officially and legally 
over until its final report was submitted, and only then were they able to take the process 
further. The report was handed over in 2003.224 
 
3.3.8 Final one-time payment 
In 2003 the South African government decided to provide victims with a one-time 
payment of R30, 000. It further stated that community reparations and assistance would 
be made available with the remaining funds in the President’s Fund.225 
 
3.3.9 Court Cases before and after the submission of the TRC’s interim final 
report 
The TRC saw it as vital to grant an ‘acceptable’ form of reparations. This is due to the 
amnesty provisions found in the TRC Act, which preclude victims of human rights 
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abuses from initiating civil claims against persons who had been granted amnesty.226 In 
the AZAPO case, the validity of the amnesty provision s 20 (7) of the TRC Act was 
challenged on constitutional grounds. Section 20 (7) provides that a person who had been 
granted amnesty may not be held liable criminally or civilly liable with regard to that act. 
The court held that the provision is constitutional, but there is however, a need for a 
reparation programme to be put in place for the victims of human rights abuses.227 The 
decision was based on the reasoning that the TRC Act obliges the government, and not 
civilian entities, to give reparations.228 
 
In 2002, while the victims were waiting for the final government reparations policy, a 
claim was filed in New York by the South African Khulumani Victim Group via the 
Alien Tort Claims Act (hereafter ATCA).229 The claim was filed against corporations 
who it alleged aided and abetted the Apartheid State.230 The defendants, however, 
appealed to dismiss the actions.231  In 2003, the South African government decided to 
provide victims with a one-time payment of R30, 000. It also intended to provide 
community reparations and assistance through opportunities.232 The reparations payouts 
began in November 2003.233 The South African government then submitted an ex parte 
declaration to the court stating that the suite was interfering with its sovereign interests. 
On 29 November 2004, Judge Sprizzo in the Southern District Court granted the 
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defendants’ motion to dismiss the case in full on grounds that aiding and abetting liability 
is not available under the Alien Tort Claims Act (hereafter ATCA).234 
On 12 October 2007, the plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
Appeal Court ruled by majority that the District Court erred in its decision, and that the 
plaintiffs could plead a theory of aiding and abetting under the ATCA. On 12 May 2008, 
the case was taken to the United States Supreme Court. The case was not heard due to the 
court lacking a quorum to hear the case.235 Five of the nine judges recused themselves as 
they have financial interests in some of the defendant companies. The case would only be 
heard in 2012 when the court has a quorum. On 9 April 2009, the US District Court for 
the Southern District of New York partially denied a motion by the defendants to dismiss 
the claim.236 
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Chapter 4: Developments after the TRC with regard to prosecutions 
 
 
This chapter examines post-TRC developments with regard to prosecutions. 
The following aspects will looked at: 
1) Special Units for Post-TRC Prosecutions 
2) Prosecution of Political Crimes after the TRC 
3) Political situation in South Africa 
4) Possible way forward 
 
4.1 The history of TRC-related prosecutions in South Africa  
The TRC recommended that prosecutions should be considered where amnesty had not 
been sought or had been denied.237  
 
4.2 Special Units for post-TRC prosecutions 
The Goldstone Commission238 completed its work regarding public violence and 
intimidation in 1993/1994. At this point in time, the Government assigned the task of 
investigating human rights abuses relating to conflicts of the past to Dr. Jan D’Oliveira, 
who was the then Attorney General of Pretoria. The South African Police Services were 
then seconded to his offices to undertake investigations with regard to these human rights 
abuses.239  
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4.3 Prosecutions by Special Units (1998-2003)  
In 1998 all the dockets with D’Oliveira Unit in respect of which no prosecutions had 
taken place were transferred to the then newly-established offices of the National 
Prosecuting Authority (hereafter NPA) in Pretoria.240 The then National Director of 
Public Prosecutions was Bulelani Ngcuka.241 In 1999, a working group called the Human 
Rights Investigative Unit (HRIU) was established within the NPA on the initiative of 
Dullah Omar242. The Unit was headed by Vincent Saldanha.243 It was mandated to 
review, investigate and possibly prosecute cases falling within the ambit of the TRC Act 
for which amnesty was denied, or where it was not applied for.244 It had to continue the 
work of the D’Oliveira Unit. Its work continued until 2000. However, no court 
proceedings were instituted during its tenure.245 In the year 2000, the dockets were 
transferred to the Directorate of Special Operations (hereafter DSO), better known as the 
Scorpions.246 The working group, within the Scorpions, to which the TRC cases were 
allocated, was known as the Special National Projects Unit, which was headed by 
Advocate Chris Macadam. The work of this Unit continued until 2003, however, no court 
proceedings were instituted during its tenure as well.247   
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4.4 Special Units after 2003 
The Final Report of the TRC was presented to the President248 on 21 March 2003.249 The 
President then had two months in which to table the report in Parliament.250 On the 24 of 
March 2003, Advocate Anton Ackerman was appointed, by presidential proclamation, as 
Special Director of Public Prosecution251 and head of the newly founded Priority Crimes 
Litigation Unit (hereafter PCLU).252 According to the proclamation, the PCLU is 
responsible for managing and directing the prosecution of crimes dealt with in the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act253 , which 
includes acts of terrorism and sabotage, high treason, sedition, mercenary activities and 
other priority crimes to be determined by the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(hereafter NDPP).254 There was no mention made of TRC-related prosecutions in the 
proclamation.255 However, at the inception of the PCLU, the NDPP declared that all 
TRC-related crimes, for which amnesty had been denied, were ‘priority crimes’ in the 
context of the proclamation. On 15 April 2003, the TRC Report was tabled before 
Parliament by President Thabo Mbeki.256 President Mbeki stated during his speech that it 
was in the hands of the NDPP to institute prosecutions where it was appropriate.257 TRC-
related matters initially made up the main proportion of the PCLU’s work.258  
 
                                                 
248 The then President of the country was Thabo Mbeki. 
249 Bubenzer O (2009: 28); International Human Rights Clinic (2008: 40). 
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253 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
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4.5 The Priority Crimes Litigation Unit 
In 2006, the PCLU consisted of six prosecutors, headed by Anton Ackerman.259 
Ackerman then instituted an audit of all available cases, which resulted in 459 cases.260 
Of this number, 160 cases were immediately deemed not to warrant further proceedings. 
Only 16 cases were identified as worthy for prosecution, and at least three were prepared 
almost immediately for indictment. The list handed over by the TRC did not contribute 
significantly to the work of the PCLU, as most of the cases on the list had already been 
known by the D’Oliveira Unit, which handed over its dockets to the PCLU. By the end of 
2006, the PCLU was working on 16 cases in total, of which five were considered to be of 
high priority and were prepared to an advanced stage. The PCLU’s primary focus is on 
cases where amnesty had been denied. The secondary focus is on cases where amnesty 
was not applied for at all. Cases that involved the use of egregious violence; and which 
resulted in the death of more than one person are of a higher priority than those that were 
directed at non-human entities such as sabotage attacks of the liberation movement. It 
should be noted that the approach followed by the PCLU is solely dependent on the 
availability of evidence and the egregiousness of the crime.261 
The biggest obstacle facing the PCLU is the severe lack of resources262, as it is 
responsible for a range of other issues, apart from TRC-related matters. In comparison to 
the D’Oliveira Unit, the PCLU has much less resources. Where the D’Oliveira Unit had 
                                                 
259 Bubenzer O (2009: 29). 
260 National Prosecution Authority, Annual Report 2002/2003. 
261 Bubenzer O (2009: 29 f). 
262 See International Human Rights Clinic (2008: 42 f). 
 
 
 
 
 47
about 20 carefully selected, highly skilled and experienced investigators, the PCLU has to 
rely on the investigators of the South African Police (hereafter SAPS).263 
 
4.6 Prosecution of politically-motivated crimes after the TRC  
The following cases represent politically-motivated crimes that were committed between 
1960 and 1994, and which potentially fell within the TRC’s mandate. Eight cases will be 
looked at in this regard. The first four cases represent proceedings that were conducted 
and initiated by regional prosecution authorities independent of any central or special 
units in Pretoria. The second set of four cases contains descriptions of cases that were 
constituted and conducted by the PCLU. 
 
4.6.1 The Wouter Basson Case (Former member of the SADF) 
On 04 October 1999 Dr. Wouter Basson, who was a member of the South African 
Defence Force (hereafter SADF) was charged with 67 counts of offences committed 
during the 1980’s.264 29 of these offences concerned murders.265 Most of the indictments 
were connected to political objectives and were allegedly committed in the fight against 
the opposition movement’s anti-apartheid struggle.266 Basson failed to apply for amnesty; 
and the application deadline had already lapsed at the time the charges were laid.267  
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After an extensive and very costly trial, he was eventually acquitted on all charges by the 
trial judge, Mr Justice Hartzenberg, on 11 April 2002.268  The failure to secure a 
conviction was mainly due to the fact that Hartzenberg rejected most of the evidence and 
witnesses that testified on behalf of the State as unconvincing and untrustworthy.269 
Three issues emerged during the trial which were of central relevance in the Appeal 
Court and the Constitutional Court litigations. There was an application made for the 
recusal of Judge Hartzenberg based on the claim that he was biased and could, therefore, 
not rule on the case objectively.270 The judge, however, refused to recuse himself. There 
was an application made from the prosecutor to introduce records of a bail hearing with 
regard to the fraud charges. Hartzenberg ruled that the bail records were inadmissible.271 
The third issue was with regard to the acquitted charges which concerned cases of murder 
and attempted murder that took place beyond the borders of South Africa.272  Since South 
African courts (according to the trial court) have no jurisdiction to try crimes which were 
committed abroad;273  the prosecutors rather pursued convictions (for these acquitted 
charges) for Basson’s participation in the ‘conspiracy’ that took place in South Africa 
based on section 18 (2) of the Riotous Assemblies Act.274 Hartzenberg, however, held 
that conspiracies to commit crimes abroad were not covered by section 18 (2) of the 
Riotous Assemblies Act.275 
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Immediately after the judgement was handed down, the State applied for the judgment to 
be reserved on certain questions of law276 for consideration by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.277 The application concerned the above three issues. Hartzenberg, however, 
reserved the recusal and the bail record issues for the Supreme Court of Appeal; but 
refused to reserve the question of whether he erred in law concerning the quashing of the 
above-mentioned charges.278 In June 2002, the NPA appealed against the judgment to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal. However, the application was seriously defective279 and the 
court did, therefore, not even consider the merits of the legal questions.280 
In mid 2003, the prosecutors applied for special leave to appeal against the judgement of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, and for leave to appeal the judgement of the High Court 
directly, at the Constitutional court.281 The application concerned the three central issues 
which had been before the Supreme Court of Appeal.282 The applications regarding the 
recusal and the admissibility of the bail records were dismissed.283  
The Court then examined whether the quashing of the charges in the trial court was based 
on a proper interpretation of section 18 (2) of the Riotous Assembly Act by looking at the 
main arguments of counsel and the State.284 Counsel for the State argued that the s 47 
Military Discipline Code criminalised certain conduct of SADF members even though 
these acts were committed beyond the borders of South Africa. It also argued that s 19 A 
of the Riotous Assemblies Act provided that it was applicable in South West Africa. It 
                                                 
276 This provision can be found under section 319 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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283 Bubenzer O (2009: 49). 
284 S. v Basson (CC) Case no. CCT 30/03 (9 September 2005) at para. 210. 
 
 
 
 
 50
finally argued that South African Courts have jurisdiction to try crimes that were 
committed abroad where there was a sufficient connection between the crime and South 
Africa.285  
The Court held that according to s 47 of the Military Discipline Code SADF members 
who commit offences are criminally liable; even if the crimes were committed abroad. 
Persons who committed murders beyond the borders of South Africa’s would, therefore, 
be liable for prosecution in both the military and the ordinary South African Courts.286 
The Court then looked at the argument of the State with regard to the connection between 
the crime and South Africa. It held that the rule which provides that South African courts 
do not have jurisdiction over crimes that are committed abroad is not absolute.287 It held 
that courts do have jurisdiction in instances where there is a real and substantial link 
between the crime and country in question.288 It based its ruling on a Canadian Supreme 
Court decision.289 The Court, therefore, ordered that the quashing of the charges be set 
aside.290 The Constitutional Court held that the previously quashed indictment stands and 
that it was up to the State to charge Basson anew.291 However, the NPA decided not to re-
charge Basson as it would violate the double jeopardy rule, which would be an 
inescapable obstacle for a new indictment.292  
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288 S. v Basson (CC) Case no. CCT 30/03 (9 September 2005) at para. 228. 
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4.6.2 Mkosana and Gonya Case (Members of the former Ciskei Defence Force) 
Vakele Mkosana and Mzamile Gonya Mkosana were both charged with one count of 
murder and two counts of attempted murder in October 2001.293 These charges were in 
relation to the Bisho Massacre (which occurred on 07 September 1992); and which was 
also one of the most serious and tragic political killings that occurred during the South 
African transition period.294 Both accused made amnesty applications295 which were 
subsequently refused in 2000 due to the absence of a political objective.296 
 
On 3 March 2002, Judge White held that both accused were not guilty and were therefore 
acquitted on all charges.297 This case has been criticised by many, including the NPA. It 
reflects critically on the capacity and ability of the prosecutorial arm of the criminal 
justice system. The outcome of this case also has an impact upon the State’s willingness 
to prosecute similar crimes in the future.298 
 
4.6.3 The trial of Michael Luff (A former Policeman) 
In November 2001, Michael Luff was charged with murder in the Regional Court of 
Worcester in the Western Cape. Luff was accused of having shot William Dyasi in 
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1985.299 Luff applied for amnesty with regard to this crime.300 His application was, 
however, subsequently refused (in 2000) due to the lack of a political objective.301  
 
In 2001, the case was resumed and went to trial. The prosecution proceeded without any 
involvement by the unit of TRC prosecutions in Pretoria. Luff was, however, acquitted in 
May 2002, by Magistrate Van Rensburg, as there was not sufficient proof to prove his 
guilt.302 The victim’s relatives found it difficult to accept that there was insufficient 
evidence, as Luff admitted to have killed Dyasi at the TRC hearings.303  
 
4.6.4 The Case of Tyani and Gumengu (Former members of the Transkei 
Homeland Security Police) 
In 2004, Tyani and Gumengu were each charged with having murdered Sithembele 
Zokwe on 8 August 1987.304 In 1996, Aron Mtobeli Tyani and Pumelele Gumengu had 
applied for amnesty with regard to the murder.305 The amnesty committee (in 2000) 
denied them amnesty for lack of ‘full disclosure’.306  
 
Tyani and Gumengu were found guilty of murder.307 Both were sentenced to 25 years of 
imprisonment.308 
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303 Bubenzer O (2009: 60). See also section 31 (3) of the TRC Act for provision on self incriminating 
evidence. 
304 S. v Tyani and Gumengu, indictment. See Bubenzer O (2009: 60); See also See Mallinder L (2009: 110). 
305 TRC Amnesty Applications no. AM/3786/96 and AM/3610/96. 
306 TRC Amnesty Committee Decision no. AC/2000/042. 
307 S. Tyani and Gumengu (Transkei division) Case no. 76/2004, unreported, at para. 55. See Bubenzer O 
(2009: 62). 
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4.6.5 The Eugene Terre’ Blanche case (Former leader of the Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging) 
Terre’ Blanche was accused of various terrorist attacks during the 1990’s which 
potentially fell into the TRC’s mandate. Terre’ Blanche, however, failed to apply for 
amnesty regarding these acts, but entered into a ‘plea agreement’ with the PCLU in terms 
of 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act.309  
 
On 12 November 2003 Terre’ Blanche pleaded guilty to five counts of terrorism in 
contravention of section 54 (1) (i) the Internal Security Act310 and was sentenced to six 
years of imprisonment, which was wholly suspended.311 It should be noted that Eugene 
Terre’ Blanche has recently been murdered. It should also be noted that Eugene Terre’ 
Blanche case was the first TRC-related trial conducted by the PCLU.312 
 
4.6.6 The case of Nieuwoudt, van Zyl and Koole (The PEBCO-Three Case)  
In 2004, Gideon Nieuwoudt (who died in 2005), Johannes Martin van Zyl, and Johannes 
Koole were each charged with three counts of abduction, assault and murder 
respectively.313 They all, however, applied for amnesty with regard to these offences.314  
In 1999, all the applications were refused.315 Nieuwoudt and van Zyl, however, made 
applications to review their refusal of amnesty in 2004. This occurred shortly after their 
                                                                                                                                                 
308 Bubenzer O (2009: 63); International Human Rights Clinic (2008: 131). 
309 Bubenzer O (2009: 64); Mallinder L (2009: 114). 
310 Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. 
311 Bubenzer O (2009: 64); Mallinder L (2009: 114). 
312 Bubenzer O (2009: 64); International Human Rights Clinic (2008: 131). 
313 Bubenzer O (2009: 67). 
314 TRC Amnesty Applications AM 3920/96; AM 5637/97; AM3748/96. 
315 TRC Amnesty Committee Decision AC/99/0223. 
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bail hearings.316 If the review proceedings succeed; van Zyl would be freed from civil 
and criminal liability.317 The proceedings against Koole are also affected by the review 
proceedings, as the charges will be tried jointly.318 
 
The case at hand is similar to the proceedings of the Motherwell Four incident in which 
Nieuwoudt and two other policemen were convicted of murder 1996. The conviction was 
then immediately appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. An application for amnesty 
was also made with regard to the conviction in 1996. In this case the appeal proceeding 
was postponed pending a final decision on the question of amnesty. Amnesty was 
eventually denied to all the applicants in December 1999.319 An application was then 
made in 2001 for a review of the amnesty refusal. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
the appeal litigation would remain pending until the review litigation has been concluded; 
as the amnesty application would only be disposed of once the review proceedings have 
been concluded.320 In 2007, the (newly formed) amnesty committee decided to grant 
amnesty to du Toit and Ras, but refused amnesty to Nieuwoudt.321 Nieuwoudt, however, 
died before the decision was handed down.322 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
316 Bubenzer O (2009: 68). 
317 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act s 20 (8). 
318 Bubenzer O (2009: 69); See Mallinder L (2009: 115 ff). 
319 TRC Amnesty Committee Decision AC/99/0345. 
320 Bubenzer O (2009: 70 f); See Mallinder L (2009: 115ff). 
321 Bubenzer O (2009: 71 f). 
322 See Mallinder L (2009: 115 ff). 
 
 
 
 
 55
4.6.7 The Blani Case 
In October 2004, Buyile Roni Blani was tried for his involvement in the killing of two 
people in 1985. When the case was prosecuted in 1985, Blani had already managed to 
escape to exile in Angola. When Blani returned from exile in 1992, he failed to apply for 
amnesty.323 
 
Ackerman came across Blani’s docket and saw that the case was investigated fully and 
that the evidence was clear and compelling. In June 2004, Blani was arrest and then 
granted bail.324 On 25 April 2005, Blani was convicted on all charges and sentenced to 
five years imprisonment, four of which were suspended for five years.325 
 
4.6.8 Kok, van der Merwe, Otto, van Staden and Smith (The attempted murder of 
Frank Chikane) 
In November 2004, the PCLU was ready to arrest three former officers of the South 
African security police (hereafter SAPS) on charges which related to the attempted 
murder of Frank Chikane in 1989.326 The three former policemen were: former Major-
General Christoffel Smith, Gert Otto and Johannes ‘Manie’ van Staden, who had to 
appear in court on charges of attempted murder. The accused persons did not, however, 
make use of the amnesty process.327  
 
                                                 
323 Bubenzer O (2009: 73 ff). 
324 Bubenzer O (2009: 73 ff). 
325 S. V Buyile Ronnie Blani (ECD) Case no. CC 81/2004 (25 April 2005), unreported. See Bubenzer O 
(2009: 75); See also Mallinder L (2009: 114). 
326 Bubenzer O (2009: 76); See Mallinder L (2009: 121). 
327 Bubenzer O (2009: 76 f). 
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After the accused were informed of their imminent arrests, the arrest warrants were 
withdrawn and the bail hearings were suspended.328 It was reported that the decision was 
taken by senior members of the NPA. The ‘most likely scenario is that the NDPP, 
Bulelani Ngcuka, directed the PCLU to stop the proceedings.’329 The official reason 
given by the NPA for the sudden reversal of the PCLU’s decision to prosecute was that it 
lacked guidelines for dealing with TRC-related prosecutions, and therefore specific 
guidelines were needed.330 These events led to the imposition of the said moratorium on 
all TRC-related investigations in late November 2004.331 The moratorium came to an end 
in January 2006, and only in early 2007 further developments on this case took place.332 
 
In early 2007, the NPA informed the alleged three perpetrators that prosecutions would 
go ahead, and that it intended to focus on Adriaan Vlok and Johan van der Merwe as 
well.333 In August 2007, Vlok, van der Merwe, Otto, van Staden and Smith were charged 
with one count of attempted murder, alternatively with the conspiracy to murder Chikane. 
In June 2007 a plea bargain was agreed upon. On 17 August 2007 the court had to rule on 
the plea bargain agreement, which it subsequently approved. The accused all pleaded 
guilty to the charge of attempted murder. Vlok and van der Merwe were sentenced by the 
Court to ten years imprisonment, wholly suspended for five years on the condition that 
they are not convicted of a similar crime. Otto, Smith and van Staden were sentenced to 
                                                 
328 Bubenzer O (2009: 77). 
329 Bubenzer O (2009: 77). See also section 22(1) and section 22(2) of the NPA Act. These provisions give 
wide powers to the NDPP. 
330 See Mallinder L (2009: 122). 
331 Bubenzer O (2009: 77). 
332 See Mallinder L (2009: 122 ff). 
333 See Mallinder L (2009: 121). 
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five years imprisonment, wholly suspended for five years on the condition that that they 
are not convicted of a similar crime.334 
 
4.7 The Politics behind TRC-related Prosecutions 
The success or failure of prosecutions is to a large degree dependant on the political 
support for such proceedings. Political factors clearly have major consequences for the 
overall process of criminal trials. Any assessment of post-TRC prosecutions, therefore, 
has to take account of the political context within which such trials find themselves.335  
 
The following points will be addressed: 
1) The governments approach in dealing with post-TRC prosecutions. 
2) The moratorium imposed by the government. 
3) The prosecution policy and directives. 
4) The court case involving the declaring of the policy directives as invalid and 
unconstitutional. 
5) Possible ways forward 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
334 Bubenzer O (2009: 79ff); Mallinder L (2009: 122). 
335 Bubenzer O (2008: 97). 
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4.7.1 The governments approach in dealing with post-TRC prosecutions 
It should be noted that the government rarely made public statements with regard to post-
TRC prosecutions.336 However, in 1998, the then President Nelson Mandela said that 
criminal trials should commence within a fixed time period that was realistic. The trials 
should be handled by the Office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(hereafter NDPP). General amnesty should not be contemplated as it would undermine 
the culture of accountability.337 
 
In 1999, the then President Thabo Mbeki indicated that a new amnesty law should be 
considered. He alluded to the fact that many people have not applied for amnesty; and if 
the search continues, many people would be arrested. He did not want people to be 
arrested for weeks on end with regard to crimes committed almost two decades back.338 
 
In 2002, Mbeki pardoned 33 prisoners who were aligned to the ANC and PAC.339 The 
majority of these prisoners were sentenced for politically related offences. Two-thirds of 
them had either been denied amnesty, or had not applied for amnesty at all.340 
 
Later in 2002, at the ANC’s national conference included discussions regarding 
guidelines for a broad national amnesty.341 The presidency of the ANC declared that the 
                                                 
336 Bubenzer O (2008: 111). 
337 Opening address of President Mandela (1999: National Houses of Parliament). 
338 Klaaren J and Varney H (2003: 265).   
339 Ngesi S (2003: 294). 
340 Ngesi S (2003: 294). 
341 Bubenzer (2008: 112).  
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ANC was generally against the running of trials in the style of Nuremburg trials, as it 
would affect nation-building.342  
 
It should be noted that consultations also took place between the government and the 
security forces during and after the TRC’s operational period. The consultations led to an 
agreement that indemnity laws should be enacted.343  
 
In 2003, the then President Mbeki tabled the TRC Report in parliament. He ruled out the 
possibility of a general amnesty as it would fly in the face of the TRC process, and 
severely undermine the principle of accountability. Instituting another amnesty process 
would also affect the constitutional rights of those who were on the receiving end of 
human rights violations. He, therefore, left it in the hands of the NDPP to pursue any 
cases that it believed to deserve prosecution.344 
 
4.7.2 The Moratorium imposed by government 
In November 2004, a moratorium was placed on all post-TRC cases pending the 
composition and approval of prosecution guidelines. This moratorium continued until 
January 2006 when the guidelines came into effect.345 It should be noted that many cases 
prescribed during the moratorium period.346 
 
 
                                                 
342 Fernandez L (2006: 71); See Bubenzer O (2008: 113).    
343 Bubenzer O (2008: 113-128); See also Klaaren J and Varney H (2003: 265).  
344 Statement by President Mbeki (2003). 
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4.7.3 The prosecution policy and directives 
Section 179 (5) (a) and (b) of the Constitution and section 21 of the NPA Act, provides 
that the NDPP, with the concurrence of the Minister of Justice, has to determine and issue 
policy directives, which should be observed by the prosecutors in the prosecution 
process.347 In January 2006, the NPA presented a set of guidelines to the public, which 
specifically concerned TRC-related prosecutions. The so-called (prosecution policy and 
directives relating to the prosecution of offences emanating from the conflicts of the past 
and which were committed before 11 May 1994) was an amendment of the general NPA 
prosecution policy.348 The policy and directives gave prosecutors a wide discretion 
whether or not to initiate prosecutions. The purpose of the policy and directives were to 
guide the prosecutor’s discretion by achieving a fair, transparent, consistent and 
predictable process. The policy and directives did not constitute a statute. It was, 
however, binding guidelines for prosecutors to follow when exercising their discretion. 
The policy amendment came into effect on 1 December 2005.349 
 
The guidelines gave the prosecutor the power not to prosecute if certain conditions were 
met.350 These guidelines were met with much criticism which included: that it amount to 
                                                 
347 The section reads: 
(5) The National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(a) must determine, with the concurrence of the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of 
justice, and after consulting the Directors of Public Prosecutions, prosecution policy, which must be 
observed in the prosecution process; 
(b) must issue policy directives which must be observed in the prosecution process. 
Section 21 of the NPA Act repeats this instruction. 
348 Prosecution Policy; International Human Rights Clinic (2008: 41 f). 
349 Bubenzer O (2008: 129).  
350 Prosecution Policy. 
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a replica of the TRC amnesty procedure351; that perpetrators were deliberately given a 
second chance to achieve impunity; that the process outlined in the guidelines lacked 
transparency; that it lacked victim involvement; that there was no consultation with 
victim organisations during its drafting stage; and that the PCLU lacks the resources to 
handle all of the possible cases.352 It should also be noted that even though both the 
Constitution and the NPA Act require these guidelines to be drafted by the NDPP,353 in 
the present case, the guidelines were entirely drafted by the government.354 The criticisms 
led to a subsequent court case.355  
 
4.7.4 The court case regarding the constitutionality and validity of the prosecution 
policy 
Immediately after the amendments have entered into force, a number of human rights 
organisations requested of the government to set the guidelines aside.356 
In July 2007, an application was launched at the Pretoria High Court against the 
amendment of prosecution policy.357 The application sought a High Court order to 
suspend and stay the operation of the prosecution guidelines and to eventually declare the 
policy amendments to be unconstitutional, and therefore unlawful and invalid.358  
                                                 
351 Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2009: NPA Prosecution Policy for Apartheid 
Crimes: State’s application for leave to appeal dismissed). 
352 Bubenzer (2008: 139 f). 
353 See section 179 (5) (a) and (b) of the Constitution and section 21 of the NPA Act. 
354 Bubenzer O (2008: 129); See CSVR (2009: NPA Prosecution Policy for Apartheid Crimes: State’s 
application for leave to appeal dismissed). 
355 Bubenzer O (2008: 129 f). 
356 Y. Sooka Panel presentation at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation conference ‘The TRC: ten 
years on’. See Bubenzer (2008: 141). 
357 Bubenzer O (2008: 139 ff). 
358 Thembisile Nkadimeng v NDPP, Notice of Motion, Case no. 32709/07 (TPD). See Bubenzer O (2008: 
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On 12 December 2008, the High Court Judge Legodi declared the policy amendments 
inconsistent with the Constitution, unlawful and invalid and therefore suspended them.359 
The court held that the representations by perpetrators as envisaged by the policy 
amendment are not sanctioned by the Constitution.360 Section 179 (5) (d) of the 
Constitution only provides for representations in cases where a decision to institute a 
prosecution has already been taken.361 However, the court held that representations in 
terms of the amendments apply to persons who are still facing possible prosecution.362 
The Court held further that the representations in terms of the guidelines cannot be 
representation as required in terms of sections 105 A or section 204 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, as both provisions apply only to situations where a prosecution has 
already been initiated.363 The court held further that in terms of section 204 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, indemnity is granted by a court and not by the NDPP.364  
The court, thus, labelled the amendments as a ‘recipe for conflict and absurdity’.365 It also 
confirmed the position of the applicants in that it views the amended guidelines as a 
‘copy of the TRC amnesty mechanism’.366 It then held that there was a constitutional 
obligation on the NPA to prosecute.367 It also held that the normal prosecution policy is 
sufficient to provide guidelines for the decision whether to prosecute or not.368 Thus, the 
court declared the amendments to be unconstitutional. The NPA then lodged an appeal 
                                                 
359 Nkadimeng and Others v The NDPP and Others (TPD) Case no. 32709/07, unreported, at para. 18.1. 
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363 Nkadimeng and Others v The NDPP and Others (TPD) Case no. 32709/07, unreported, at para. 15.3.1.3. 
364 Nkadimeng and Others v The NDPP and Others (TPD) Case no. 32709/07, unreported, at para. 15.3.1.4. 
365 Nkadimeng and Others v The NDPP and Others (TPD) Case no. 32709/07, unreported, at para. 15.5.3. 
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367 Nkadimeng and Others v The NDPP and Others (TPD) Case no. 32709/07, unreported, at para. 15.5.2.1. 
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against the High Court ruling.369 The appeal was, however, dismissed by Judge Legodi in 
the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria on 04 May 2009.370 Prosecutors are now 
obliged to prosecute cases arising from the conflicts of the past.371 
 
4.7.5 Possible way forward 
The NPA acknowledged that it lacks guidelines for dealing with TRC-related 
prosecutions. It should also be noted that it is almost impossible to attempt to prosecute 
all the crimes committed during the apartheid era.372 It was for these reasons that the 
NPA attempted to amend its prosecutions policy.373  However, the latter policy was 
challenged on constitutional grounds. The court held that it was unconstitutional due to it 
being a copy of the TRC’s amnesty mechanism.374 The best way forward now would be 
to find a strategy which is both consistent with South Africa’s Constitution and the 
existing prosecution’s policy.375 
 
Strategy 
Prosecutors should look at all the TRC-related cases where amnesty had been denied or 
not applied for at all.376 From these cases, the NPA should then investigate which of the 
cases have sufficient evidence. Once this is established, it should assess all the cases 
                                                 
369 Bubenzer (2009: 147). 
370 Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2009: 7 f); Legal Resource Centre (2009: NPA 
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which are ready for prosecution. From the list of cases found, the most serious offences 
should receive top priority attention.377 
The amended prosecution policy378 (which was later held to be unconstitutional and 
invalid) focused mainly on disclosure of evidence by perpetrators.379 Disclosure may still 
be used as part of the strategy. Prosecutions may make use of sections 204 and 105A of 
the Criminal Procedure Act (hereafter CPA) in dealing with perpetrators wishing to make 
full disclosure of crimes which they have committed during the apartheid era.380 
Section 204 of the CPA provides that a witness may be granted full indemnity on a 
charge should he testify for the state and the court deems the testimony to be honest and 
frank. This testimony could then be used for the prosecution of more significant 
offenders.381 Section 105A of the CPA provides for plea and sentencing agreements. 
Prosecutors may make use of this section to obtain a guilty plea in exchange for a 
reduction of sentence. However, these agreements should be confirmed by courts.382  
The reduction in sentence would also require an amendment to the criminal laws which 
provide for certain minimum penalties. These reduced sentences could include the 
carrying out of community service in the community of the victims. It can also include 
some form of community reparations in the form of financial contributions or symbolic 
acts. It should be noted that these amendments to criminal laws should be narrow in 
                                                 
377 Varney H (2006: Alternative Prosecutions Strategy); See Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (2008: 3 f); See also International Human Rights Clinic (2008: 164 f). 
378 See Prosecution Policy and directives relating to prosecution of Criminal Matters arising from Conflicts 
of the Past. 
379 Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2008: 4). 
380 See Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s 105 A and 204. 
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scope with regard to the period of operation. It should also be limited to the perpetrators 
who committed offences during the apartheid conflict period. 383 
 
The above procedures require the perpetrators to appear in open court. They would thus 
be before the victims and the wider public. They would be acknowledging their 
responsibility through the guilty plea. The conviction would be entered into the public 
record and the perpetrator would then not be able to walk away without any sanctions or 
obligations whatsoever.384 The strategy is a much better option than the unconstitutional 
policy which was proposed by the NPA. 
 
4.7.6 Conclusion: Did the TRC serve its purpose for which it was established? 
South Africa’s transition to democracy was a complex and difficult one. Its truth for 
amnesty approach was the first of its kind. Its mandate of achieving truth and 
reconciliation was quite an enormous (if not an impossible) task.  
The TRC was responsible for the collection of a large amount of data which, to a certain 
extent, is now available to the public. It, therefore, contributed towards the documenting 
some of the human rights abuses which had occurred during the apartheid period. 
However, the TRC failed to establish macro-historical truth findings which constituted a 
significant part of its mandate. What we have learnt from the South African TRC 
experience is that amassing large amounts of data will not in and of itself illuminate 
macro-historical truth findings.385  
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The TRC had much difficulty with promoting reconciliation as it had no clear definition 
to work with. This was displayed by the different approaches used by the individual TRC 
members. The amnesty provisions also had a negative impact on the reconciliation 
process as many victims saw the perpetrators of gross human rights violations receiving 
civil and criminal immunity. 
The main purpose of reparations is to restore the dignity of survivors, and to rebuild 
affected communities. It should also facilitate the re-integration of survivors in the 
community.386 The South African experience did not restore the dignity of the survivors 
as many victims have still not received reparations. The AZAPO and the subsequent 
Khulumani court cases show that South Africans were, and still are not satisfied with the 
reparations provided by the government. 
The issue with Post-TRC prosecutions has a severely negative impact on the 
reconciliation process, as the victims of gross human rights abuses have not seen justice 
been done. This is due to the fact that no post-TRC prosecutions have as yet been 
instituted. The lack of political will from the side of the government also negatively 
impacts on the reconciliation process.  
The above factors display that the TRC has served the purpose for which it was 
established, to a very limited extent, but has not achieved the best results possible. 
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